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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Respondent's Brief in Opposition does not begin with the issue on which 
certiorari was granted, "whether Deseret Diversified Development had the 
authority as a beneficial owner to impose binding covenants, conditions, and 
restrictions." But, Petitioner's Reply Brief will begin with that issue. 
The Beneficiary's Authority Issue. 
On the beneficiary's authority issue, Petitioner argued in its Opening Brief 
that although a trust beneficiary has authority over its beneficial interest in the 
trust, the trustee has exclusive authority over the assets it holds in trust. 
Therefore, since the land in question was an asset held by the trustee in trust, 
Deseret Diversified had no authority to impose binding CC&R's. 
In its Respondent's Brief, Respondent claims that the Utah legislature 
changed the established rule by including a person holding a power of 
appointment in the statutory definition of trust beneficiary1 and that this Court 
changed the established rule by a 1949 decision, Cronquist v. Utah State Agr. 
College? 
In this Reply Brief, Petitioner shows that neither the statutory definition nor 
1
 Utah Code Ann. sec. 15-1-103 (1) (b) (2005 Supp.). 
2
 114 Utah 426,201 P.2d 280 (1949). 
4 
this Court's 1949 decision changed the established rule. 
The Agency Issue. 
In its Opening Brief, Petitioner argued that Security Title did not "ratify" 
the Rerecorded CC&R's by signing the plat because (1) Deseret Diversified was 
not Security Title's agent, (2) Deseret did not purport to act for Security Title, (3) 
the Utah Statute of Frauds requires any agency with respect to real property to be 
in writing, and (4) the plat and the Rerecorded CC&R's are inconsistent. 
In its Brief in Opposition, Respondent does not counter those four points, 
but argues that Deseret Development's status as "developer" gave it authority to 
impose binding CC&R's. This argument is based on agency law, not trust law. 
In this Reply Brief, Petitioner begins by discussing the "fool's errand" 
problem posed when the higher court grants certiorari on only one of two grounds 
relied on by the lower court. Petitioner argues from United States Supreme Court 
precedent that if this Court decides for Petitioner on the beneficiary's authority 
issue, it should not affirm the Court of Appeals on the agency grounds, but either 
review the agency issue itself or remand to the Court of Appeals to reconsider the 
agency issue in the light of the truth that W. Brent Jensen was not Security Title's 
president. 
Petitioner then replies to the argument Respondent makes in its Brief in 
5 
Opposition that Deseret Diversified's status as developer gave it authority to 
impose CC&R's. Petitioner points out that under the Utah Statute of Frauds, 
Deseret Diversified's status as developer did not give it agency authority with 
respect to real property. 
The Statutory Presumption Issue. 
Respondent argues in its Respondent's Brief that the statutory presumption 
that statements of fact in a recorded document are true3 applies to Deseret 
Diversified's statement in the Rerecorded CC&R's that it owns the property in 
question. Therefore, without regard to trust law or agency law, Deseret 
Diversified as the presumed owner had the right to impose the CC&R's unless 
Petitioner can prove it wasn't the true owner. 
Petitioner replies that the statutory presumption does not apply to 
declarations of ownership. Ownership is not a "fact" within the meaning of the 
statute, but a conclusion of law to be determined from the chain of title. 
The Scandalous and Unjust Conduct Issue. 
Respondent accuses Counsel for Petitioner of making a scandalous and 
unjust personal attack on the Court of Appeals. Petitioner replies that Counsel for 
Petitioner made no personal attack. Counsel only criticized what the Court of 
3
 Utah Code Ann. sec. 57 - 4a - 4 (1) (j) (2000). 
6 
Appeals tonJi'il il lil '' *II llu li'\i'l >\\ 11 ico I uc v Uie distinction is expressed as 
"hate the sin "*ut love the sinner." On the level of the law, the distinction allows a 
lawyer to challenge what a lower court did in the strongest terms without fear that 
it will be taken as a personal attack. 
ARGUMENTS 
1
 This Court has always distinguished a trust beneficiary's beneficial 
interest in a trust from the assets neia ay me irusit 
(• '• ; : ' •• -h ssots held y me trustee m u ust. 
Petiti' .> • • >1ained that " 'aw regards a trust beneficiary's property rights as an 
interest in the trust itself, analogous to shares of stock in a corporation, not as 
pi i >perty rights in the assets held by the trustee in trust, analogous lu «• 
'. < 11 poration's own assets. Pelif ioner explained that while a beneficiary has 
authority to dispose of its beneficial interest in the trust (by analogy, to sell the 
shares), a beneliciary has no aiillioiil'y Iniliipiii nl Ihe .issels held hv llie Inr.ln 
in h n s i 1 t h y -IIMIOJ'V h> si II llli1 m l p i n . I I I O H ' S . I S S I I S ) . 
In its RiieI'i11 (>pp<isition, Resp tucm oegins by ignoring the distinction. 
Respondent quotes the Restatement rule that "the beneficiary of a trust has the 
4
 Petitioner's Opening Brief, pr 1 n 1 ft 
7 
power to transfer his interest,"5 and then applies this rule to the assets held by the 
trustee in trust, as though they were the same thing.6 
On the irrelevance of the Uniform Probate Code. 
Respondent then argues that the Utah legislature "implicitly acknowledged" 
that beneficiaries have power of disposition over the assets held in trust by 
including in the statutory definition of "beneficiary" a person who holds a power 
of appointment.7 Frankly, Petitioner does not understand Respondent's argument 
on this point, but Petitioner will reply by explaining why the inclusion of a person 
holding a power of appointment in the statutory definition of "beneficiary" has 
nothing to do with the issue of a beneficiary's authority over the assets held in 
trust. 
A power of appointment creates a problem for a trust. Until the power is 
exercised, the ultimate beneficiary will remain unknown. For example, suppose 
Grantor deeds Blackacre to T in trust, income to L for life, and then the trust to 
terminate and T to convey Blackacre to such person as P shall appoint by deed or 
5
 Respondent's Brief, p. 23, quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, 
sec. 132(1959). 
6
 "The general right of the beneficiary to alienate its interest in the trust res 
is reaffirmed by the Utah Uniform Trust Code." Respondent's Brief p. 23. 
7
 Respondent's Brief, p. 24. 
8 
will, or, if P makes no appointment, to Q. In this example, P holds a classic 
"general power of appointment." 
L is the life beneficiary, but who is the remainder beneficiary? If T 
threatens to cut down all the trees on Blackacre, who can bring an action to 
prevent the waste? L wont. Cutting down the trees will generate more income for 
L. But, until P exercises the power of appointment (or dies without having 
exercised it), the ultimate remainder beneficiary will remain unknown. 
The Utah Uniform Probate Code solves this problem by including P in the 
statutory definition of "beneficiary."8 P can bring an action to prevent the waste 
even though the ultimate remainder beneficiary remains unknown. The statutory 
definition does not reverse the established rule that a trust beneficiary has no 
power of disposition over the assets held by the trustee in trust. It solves the 
problem of the unknown beneficiary. 
On the irrelevance of Cronquist v. Utah State Agr. College. 
Respondent then argues that this Court ruled that a beneficiary has authority 
to convey assets held by the trustee in trust in 1949 by its decision in Cronquist v. 
8
 "'Beneficiary' means a person that:. . . (ii) in a capacity other than that 
of a trustee, holds a power of appointment over trust property." Utah Code. Ann. 
sec. 75 - 7 -103 (1) (b) (2005 Supp.). 
9 
Utah State Agr. College.9 Respondent says of that case: "wherein the Court 
permitted the beneficiary to convey, by quitclaim deed, his interest in the College 
Farm."10 
The facts in Cronquist were simple. Olif Cronquist died in 1927 and left the 
College Farm in trust, income to his three children for twenty years and, at the end 
of the twenty years, the trust to terminate and the trustee to convey the farm to the 
three children in equal shares. In 1944, when the trust still had three more years to 
go, Heber Cronquist, one of Olif s three children, entered into an executory 
contract to sell his one-third share of the College Farm to Utah State Agricultural 
College when he received it from the trustee and also executed and delivered to 
Utah State a quitclaim deed to the farm. The quitclaim deed was delivered to Utah 
State before the trust terminated. After the trust terminated in 1947, Heber 
brought an action to have the contract and the quitclaim deed declared invalid on 
the grounds that the trust had been a spendthrift trust and, therefore, he had no 
power to alienate his interest in the trust in 1944. Utah State counterclaimed for 
specific performance of the executory contract. The lower court held for Utah 
State and Heber appealed. 
9
 114 Utah 426,201 P.2d 280 (1949). 
10
 Respondent's Brief pp. 18-29. 
10 
In its decision in Cronquist, this Court said that "there is only one 
substantial question involved, and that is whether the testamentary trust created by 
the will of Olif Cronquist was what is known as a spendthrift trust."11 The holding 
of this Court was that to create a valid spendthrift trust "[t]he intention to establish 
a spendthrift trust ought clearly to appear in the instrument creating the trust. 
There should be specific language declaring the trust or language from which such 
an interest might reasonably be inferred. A mere trusteeship is not enough to 
make a spendthrift trust."12 Applying that holding to Olif Cronquist's 
testamentary trust, this Court held it was not a spendthrift trust. 
The holding of Cronquist has nothing to do with the issue of what interest, 
if any, Heber transferred by the quitclaim deed.13 Still, the fact is that Heber 
executed and deliver a quitclaim deed before the trust terminated. So, the question 




 201 P. 2d at 285, internal citations and quotations omitted. 
13
 An interesting question is whether Heber would have had grounds to 
invalidate the quitclaim deed if the trust had been a spendthrift trust. His 
quitclaim deed only conveyed whatever rights he had. So, if he had no rights at all 
(assuming that would be the consequence if the trust had been a spendthrift trust) 
he would have conveyed nothing by the quitclaim deed. But that is no reason to 
invalidate a quitclaim deed. 
11 
It certainly was not Heber's rights as trust beneficiary in the College Farm. 
If Utah State had been relying on the quitclaim deed as conveying those rights, it 
would not have insisted that he perform the executory contract. It wanted a new 
deed from Heber after he received the land from the trustee. It did not rely on the 
quitclaim deed to convey the fee. 
The most likely answer is that Utah State was concerned that Heber had 
rights in the land not as a trust beneficiary but as Olif s "heir." If Olif s will were 
held to be invalid, Heber would take a share of the farm as one of Olif s heirs. 
Utah State must have wanted to be sure that if Olif s will were invalid it would 
still get Heber's share of the farm, so it had Heber execute and deliver the 
quitclaim deed to convey whatever rights Heber might have as Olif s heir. These 
did not include the rights he had as trust beneficiary. Nor did Heber convey his 
beneficial interest in the trust. If he had, when the trust terminated, the trustee 
would have deeded Heber's share of the farm directly to Utah State. Utah State 
had Heber enter into an executory contract to convey his one third interest in the 
farm when the trust ended and the land was distributed to him.14 
14
 This Court did not address the issue of whether, assuming the trust had 
been a spendthrift trust, Heber could nevertheless enter into a valid executory 
contract to sell his share of the College Farm in the future when he received it 
from the trust. Was his entering into the executory contract "alienating his interest 
in the trust?" Most trust lawyers today would say it was not. 
12 
So, Cronquist is not a case where this Court "permitted the beneficiary to 
convey, by quitclaim deed, his interest in the College Farm," as Respondent 
claims. It is a case where this Court permitted an heir to convey, by quitclaim 
deed, his rights as heir. This Court has never strayed from the classic rule that 
"the trustee has exclusive control over the trust property, subject only to the 
limitations imposed by law or the trust instrument."15 
2. If this Court decides for the Petitioner on the beneficiary's authority 
issue, it should not turn this appeal into a fool's errand by affirming on the 
agency grounds, but either take up the agency issue itself or remand to the 
Court of Appeals for reconsideration. 
The first point is that this Court did not grant certiorari on the agency issue, 
so why does Respondent feel free to discuss it? 
The problem of a grant of certiorari on one issue when the lower court has 
decided the case on two grounds is the "fool's errand." If this Court decides for 
Petitioner on the issue on which certiorari was granted (the beneficiary's authority 
issue), is it obliged to affirm the Court of Appeals on the alternative grounds on 
which certiorari was not granted (the agency grounds)? If it is, this Court sent 
Petitioner on a fool's errand when it granted certiorari. 
15
 In Re Estate of Flake, 2003 UT 17, para. 12,71 P.3d 589,594. 
13 
The solution for the fool's errand problem is shown by the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno.16 In that case a plane 
manufactured by Piper Aircraft in America crashed in Scotland. The pilot and the 
passengers were all Scotts. A Scottish company operated and serviced the plane. 
The pilot had been trained in Scotland and at the time of the crash the plane was 
subject to Scottish air control. The Scottish air safety authorities investigated the 
crash. 
The passengers' next of kins brought an action in California. They frankly 
acknowledged that their purpose in bringing the action in the United States was to 
take advantage of its more favorable products liability law. The action was 
removed to federal court and transferred to the Middle District of Pennsylvania. 
Piper then moved for dismissal on the grounds of forum non conveniens, 
stipulating that it would personally appear and defend an action in Scotland. 
The trial court granted Piper's motion, but the Third Circuit reversed on two 
grounds. It held that dismissal is never appropriate when the law of the alternative 
forum is less favorable to the plaintiff. It also held that under the Gilbert 
balancing test, Pennsylvania was the more appropriate forum in any case. 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the "law less 
16
 454 U.S. 235 (1981). 
14 
fii\ nrable to plaintiff issiir huf no! on Hit "Gilbertbalancing test" grounds. It 
then reversed the Third Circuit on both issues, holding that the action should be 
dismissed under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 
In the majority opinion, the issue of whether the Court was going beyond 
the grant of certiorari is discussed in a footnote. Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote 
that the second grounds was implicitly within the grant of certiorari, but 
"even if the issues we discuss in Part III [i.e.,the application of the Gilbert 
balancing test] are not within the bounds of the questions with respect to 
which certiorari was granted, our consideration of these issues is not 
inappropriate. An order limiting the grant of certiorari does not operate as a 
jurisdictional bar. We may consider questions outside the scope of the 
limited order when resolution of those questions is necessary for the proper 
disposition of the case."17 
Justice Marshall wrote for a majority of six justices. Three dissented. The 
dissenters thought the proper disposition was to remand the case to the Third 
Circuit for reconsideration of the Gilbert balancing test. None of the justices 
thought the decision of the Third Circuit should be affirmed on the alternative 
ground, turning the granting certiorari 
Applying I lit* i tilt- ol /'//;< v Aircraft to the facts of this case, this Court 
should either take up the agency issue itself (perhaps asking for additional briefs) 
or remand to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in the light of the truth that 
17
 454 U.S. at 247 n. 12. 
15 
W. Brent Jensen was not the president of Security Title. 
3. Status as "developer" does not confer agency authority to impose 
CC&R's on land. 
Respondent argues that Deseret Diversified's status as developer is apparent 
from the Rerecorded CC&R's and the plat, and that this status gave it authority to 
impose CC&R's. Petitioner replies that a "developer" can have any one of a 
number of legal relationships with the land owner. The developer can be an 
independent contractor who has only agreed to do a job and is not subject to 
control by the owner. It can be an agent who has agreed to act for the owner's 
benefit and to be subject to the owner's control.18 It can be an employee who has 
also agreed to be subject to the owner's control with respect to the manner in 
which the job is done.19 "Developer" itself is not a status to which the law gives 
any agency authority at all. 
When it comes to real property, status does not create agency authority. The 
employees the local Home Depot all have "employee" status, but that does not 
give them authority to impose CC&R's on Home Depot's land. When it comes to 
18
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY sec. 1 (1958). 
19
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY sec 2 (1958). 
16 
real property, llu I 'l.ih Maluk of I'nudv'0 pre idt lli;il anlhonh i an i>i'k ' r 
111 1111 M , IM' i here is a written document signed by the owner of record, 
Security Title, the Plat for Forest Meadow Ranch Plat "D." The plat does not say 
that Deseret Diversified was Security Title's "agent." It does not rarity the 
Rerecorded CC&R's. It does not even refer to them. It does not even cover the 
same geographic area. The Court of Appeals wrongly says that W. Brent Jensen 
signed the plat for both Security Title and for Deseret Diversified. If he had 
signed for both company's that would have been some evidence that the two 
lelalionship does not ireale agency authority. 
The phrase "as a matter of law" is critical when the issues in this case are 
matters of the interpretation of recorded documents. The premise of the Utah 
recording system is that rights in real property are to be decided from the recorded 
documents, reading those documents in accordance with rules of law so that every 
lawyer and every judge will give them the same meaning. 
IIK meaning ol lh< "Ownri \ I >0(1HM1 ion'' is Ihe \ame on every plat. Itdoes 
nol establish who owns 1.1 K: land, but only that, if and to the extent the signors have 
20
 Utah Code Ann. set (1998). 
17 
some interest in the land, they dedicate to the public whatever part of the land 
shown as public property. 
Statements on a plat can also put people on "inquiry notice." Again, this is 
a matter of law. Every lawyer and judge who reads the plat will be put on inquiry 
notice as to the same things. 
Two statements on the Forest Meadow Ranch Plat "D" put people on 
inquiry notice. The "subdivider's note" puts people on inquiry notice that Deseret 
Diversified may own the streets. The note says "all streets shown hereon shall 
remain the property of the subdivider, 'Deseret Diversified Development.'" [R-
0027, Addendum document "3" in Petitioner's Opening Brief]. Then there is the 
word "trustee" following the name of Security Title. These statements do not 
prove Deseret Development owned the streets or that it was the beneficiary of the 
trust. They put people on inquiry notice that Deseret might have some ownership 
interest and that there might be a trust. 
Being put on inquiry notice means that if there is an unrecorded deed by 
which Security Title transferred the streets to Deseret Diversified, or an 
unrecorded declaration of trust making Deseret Diversified the trust beneficiary, 
that unrecorded document will be valid and binding. Inquiry notice does not 
create property rights. It keeps property rights created by other documents from 
18 
being invalidated by failure to record. In this case, of course, those other 
documents have never been produced. 
lie statutoi i jo i ttion that statem* >f fact in recorded 
documents are true does not apply to claims of ownership because the statute 
regards ownership as a conclusion of law, not as a "fact." 
Respondent argues beginning at the bottom of page "14" and continuing on 
to the end of page "19" of its Brief that the statutory presumption that "recitals and 
other statements of fact in a [recorded] document . . . are true,"21 applies to 
the statement made by Deseret Diversified in the Rerecorded CC&R's that is the 
"owner" of the south half of Section 22. This argument is purely statutory 
not grounded in trust law or agency law. 
IVIilionti K'plics thai o'\ ni'i'ihiii is not ,i "h r f w it hi n the meaning ofthe 
umption. The basic principle ofthe Utah Statute of Frauds and the 
Utah Recording Act is that ownership is to be determined from the chain of title, 
not from self-serving declarations. Therefore, "ownership" is not a "fact" within 
the meaning ofthe statutory presumption. "Ownership" is a conclusion of law to 
be reached from an examination ofthe documents in the chain of title. 
Utah Code Ann. sec. 57 - 4a - 4(l)(j) (2000). 
19 
If the statutory presumption applies to a self-serving declaration of 
ownership, transferring property by recorded deeds is so much vanity. If 
declarations trump the chain of title, people should record declarations of 
ownership of whatever property they'd like to own and not bother with deeds. 
The "facts" covered by the statutory presumption are facts like those stated 
in the statute - mergers and name changes of organizations. 
4. Counsel for Petitioner did not make a personal attack on the Utah 
Court of Appeals. He criticized the Court of Appeals for what it did. 
The Bible tells of many prophets who criticized the Jewish people for what 
they did - starting with Moses' criticism of the people with respect to their making 
a golden calf22 and ending with John the Baptist's call for the Jewish people to 
repent.23 But the prophets' criticism was for what the people did, not for who they 
were. The prophets loved and respected the Jewish people. It was this love that 
drove them to speak out. The prophets hated the sin but loved the sinners. 
Some people did not appreciate the distinction. John the Baptist was 
beheaded.24 
22
 EXODUS 32 (King James). 
23
 MATTHEW3:1-11 (King James). 
24
 MATTHEW 14: 1 - 12 (King James). 
20 
Like the prophets of old, counsel ku lYlitioiut low s I In.' I.iw. I h> hn\ 
provides the common j..»i( ii 11 ii I \\\\nr ivnplc ol iliflnt'iil I,KVS. religions, and ethnic 
backgrou ommon good. This, counsel for Petitioner 
In lu'vts, is Amrnni's defining characteristic. Our respect for the law transcends 
our differences of race, religion, and ethnic background and turns those 
differences into a source of strength that nations whose identities are based on a 
common race, religion, or ethnicity cannot understand. So, like the prophets of 
old, Counsel for Petitioner criticized the Court of Appeals and Judge Greenwood 
for what they did. He did not make a personal attack. 
So Petitiont simple 
question "whai i • '• •' «ireenwood do?" 
!<:.>.' : ; Counsel for Petitioner of making "scandalous and 
unjust" criticism in broad terms, but two specific matters stand out, (1) the factual 
question of whether W. Brent Jensen was the president of Security Title, (2) the 
legal question of whether paragraph "17" of Capital Assets Financial Services v. 
Maxwell25 holds that a trust beneficiary can encumber real property held by 
trustee in trust. 
Was W, lis ml .linst'ii llii president of Security Title? 
25
 2000 UT 9,994 P.2d 201. 
21 
In her opinion Judge Greenwood wrote as follows: 
"Respondent urges that the interests that later became Deseret were the 
same as the beneficiaries of the trust naming Security as trustee, and that 
those beneficiaries were sufficiently definite. Indeed, the facts appear to 
support this conclusion that Deseret was the beneficial owner despite the 
lack of comprehensive documentation. Jensen signed on behalf of both 
Security and Deseret: listed himself as president of Security and 
incorporator of Deseret: and utilized the term "trustee" only for Security. 
Moreover, Deseret signed the 1971 CC&R's as beneficial owner and 
developer. Such evidence is consistent with a scheme in which Deseret 
would oversee the development of the property granted in the Bates Deed. 
As such, we conclude the word "trustee" on the 1971 CC&R's, together 
with extrinsic evidence, reflect the existence of a trust, with Deseret as 
beneficiary." [2005UT App 264 at para. 30, emphasis added]. 
What is wrong with that passage? Please take the time to read it again and 
then consider the following questions: 
(1) Who are "the interests that later became Deseret?" Is that phrase 
sufficiently precise to identify a specific person? Is there anything in the real 
estate records that shows who that person was? How does a person "become" a 
corporation? Petitioner submits that the passage does not identify the trust 
beneficiary in 1965, the date of the Bates Deed, and that the rule of law is that 
there can be no trust without an identifiable trust beneficiary.26 
26
 Utah Code Ann. sec. 75 - 7 - 402 (1) ( c) (Supp. 2004), cited by the Court 
of Appeals at 2005 UT App 294, para. 30; Sundquist v. Sundquist, 639 P.2d 181, 
183 (1981)(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS see's. 2 and 17 (1959); 
GEORGE T. BOGART, TRUSTS sec. 11 (6th ed. 1987). 
22 
(2) Where is "the trust naming Security as trustee 
Frauds expressly requites ,i vMilh.ii Ini' I Mm uniriii in i H nc i HUM with irspect Id 
i ciil properly Where is iT Whether the trust was written or oral, what were the 
lei ms of the trust? The rule of law is that there can be no trust unless the terms of 
trust are known.27 
(3) The truth is that W. Brent Jensen did not sign anything on behalf of 
Security Title, but precisely what document is Judge Greenwood writing about 
when she wrote the underlined sentence? Assuming Judge Greenwood is writing 
about the Plat for Forest Meadow Ranch i please t 
nnW Addendum docuii i ., ^ -' 
:•• 'Vis dPetiti* espectfully suggests that the Court 
• rhe record itself on such an important point. 
Please note that "Leo D. Jensen" signed for Security Title as its "vice 
president." Please note that the notarial acknowledgment identifies "Leo D. 
Jensen & L.R. Wright" as the vice president and secretary of Security Title Co. 
(4) Next, the Court may want to look over Respondent Appellee" 
filed with the C ' Appeals in I h is case on (>< Inlui • Jl, 
27
 Sundquist v. Sundquist, 639 P.2d 181,184 (1981) (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS sec. 2 and 4 (1959); GEORGE T. BOGART, TRUSTS sec. 11 (6th 
ed. 1987). 
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Respondent never claimed that W. Brent Jensen had signed any document on 
behalf of Security Title. What this means is that the false claim that W. Brent 
Jensen signed the plat on behalf of Security Title originated with Judge 
Greenwood. 
Courts of law sit in judgment on other professions. Suppose a doctor 
operated on "Leo D. Jensen" when the true patient was "W. Brent Jensen." The 
doctor might become the defendant in a court of law. Doctors are expert in 
medicine. What are judges expert in? Does what the Judge Greenwood did in this 
case meet this Court's professional standards? 
Finally, please note the critical importance in Judge Greenwood's opinion 
of her false claim that W. Brent Jensen was the president of Security Title. It is 
the only evidence that Judge Greenwood cites to support her holding that "the 
interests that later became Deseret" were the trust beneficiary in 1965. She also 
cites the Rerecorded CC&R's, but they date from 1971, so they are irrelevant to 
the situation in 1965. 
What did this Court hold in Capital Assets Financial Management? 
In Petitioner's Opening Brief, it points out that in paragraph "17" of its 
decision in Capital Assets Financial Management v. Maxwell this Court held that 
no trust is created when property is transferred by quitclaim deed for the purpose 
24 
of the transferee using it as collateral for a loan. Counsel J 01 IVIitionei llim 
argued that it is logically impossiI ik in ITI Iron) MM! Imlilm^ in ,i holdim' thill trust 
beneficiaries I i<»u',u II i mill', in CIKIIIIIIK I llu* jissrMielil by ;I trustee in trust. 
.1'lease reread Respondent's explanation of Capital Assets in footnote "8" on 
page " 19" of the its Respondent's Brief. Respondent's quotations from the 
opinion deal with the question of whether a judgment lien attaches to assets held 
by a judgment debtor who is also a trustee. They have nothing to do with the 
authority of a trust beneficiary to encumber the assets held by the trustee in trust. 
Finally, please reread Justice Stewart's opinion in Capital Ass en 
convenience, a xerox copy is attached In ll'is hiH .is Addentlimi ilnnimrnl '7 " 
Please make n|i w \\\\ ml w hrtlin i irasmmiMc person could draw 
In mi (he language <>l p;ii;i(.',rapli "I /" the holding that trust beneficiaries have the 
power ncumber the assets held by their trustees in trust. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons given above, Petitioner respectfully asks this Court to hold 
that trust beneficiaries do not have authority to impose binding CC&R's on land 
held by trustees in trust, and then take up the agency issue, e11h<• i <KT II11111• it ,11111 
reversing the Com Appeals, wi iviiiandirij', to Ifn < ntiil nl Appeals f«>r 
reconsiilemt MI iij.'Jit n' 'hr truth th- •' Jensen did not sign the plat for 
25 
Security Title. 
Respectfully submitted, this 6th day of March, 2006. 
/s/ Boyd Kimball Dyer 
Counsel for Petitioner/Appelkint 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the following date I served two copies of the foregoing 
Reply Brief by depositing the same in the U.S. Postal Service, first class postage 
prepaid, addressed to the following person: 
Mr. Edwin C. Barnes, Esq. 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee 
Clyde Snow Sessions & Swenson 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 - 2216 
Dated: March 6,2006 /<? f] i / 
/s/ Boyd Kimball Dyer i \ 
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ADDENDUM DOCUMENT "7" - The Capital Assets Opinion. 
CAPITAL ASSETS FINANCIAL SERV. 
Cite as 994 P.2d 201 (Utah 2000) 
v. MAXWELL Utah 201 
2000 UT 9 
CAPITAL ASSETS FINANCIAL 
SERVICES, Plaintiff and 
Petitioner, 
v. 
Garlon J. MAXWELL, Dean R. Lindsay, 
Val B. Johnson and Janae Peterson 
a.k.a. Janae Lott, Defendants and Re-
spondents. 
No. 980222. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 14, 2000. 
Holder of trust deed brought action to 
establish priority of its claim over real prop-
erty, as against judgment lienholder. The 
District Court, Provo Department, Howard 
H. Maetani, J., granted trust deed holder's 
motion for summary judgment, and judg-
ment lienholder appealed. The Court of Ap-
peals, 956 P.2d 1090, reversed and remanded. 
Certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court, 
Stewart, J., held that grantor's quitclaim 
deed of property to grantee so that grantee 
could pledge the property as collateral for a 
loan secured by a trust deed created a "real 
property" interest in grantee upon which a 
judgment lien attached. 
Judgment of Court of Appeals affirmed. 
1. Certiorari <S=>64(1) 
On certiorari, the Supreme Court re-
views the decision of the Court of Appeals for 
correctness. 
2. Judgment <£=>752 
A judgment lien has no greater dignity 
in property law than the nature of the prop-
erty interest to which it attaches. 
3. Mortgages <&=>138 
A trust deed is intended to convey some 
kind of title to real property. 
4. Mortgages <S^ 138 
Of necessity, a trust deed conveys more 
than "bare legal title" to land because the 
point of the deed is to allow the sale of the 
property upon default to satisfy the underly-
ing obligation. U.C.A.1953, 57-1-23. 
5. Judgment <s^ 780(2) 
A judgment hen attaches to a debtor's 
beneficial and equitable property interests, 
even if the debtor has no record title. 
UCA1953, 78-22-1. 
6. Judgment <®=>801 
Once a judgment lien attaches, a judg-
ment creditor may levy execution on the 
property or foreclose on the lien if called 
upon to defend against an action to cancel 
the lien interest. 
7. Judgment e=>780(5) 
A judgment lien will not attach to a 
debtor's "bare legal title" in property be-
cause such a debtor holds no equitable or 
beneficial interest in the land. U.C.A.1953, 
78-22-1. 
8. Judgment <®=>780(3) 
A judgment lien will not attach to a 
vendor's interest in a land sale contract. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-22-1. 
9. Judgment <s=>780(5) 
No judgment lien will attach to an 
agent's or trustee's interest in property. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-22-1. 
10. Principal and Agent ^127.1,129 
An agent may hold title to property 
after purchasing it, or before selling it, on 
behalf of the actual owner. 
11. Trusts <®=>134 
Trustees hold title in the res of a trust in 
their names, but do so on behalf of the trust 
beneficiaries, not themselves. 
12. Judgment <S=>780(1) 
Grantor's quitclaim deed of property to 
grantee so that grantee could pledge the 
property as collateral for a loan secured by a 
trust deed transferred a beneficial interest in 
the property to grantee, though grantee 
deeded the property back to grantor after 
obtaining the loan, and thus, grantee's inter-
est constituted "real property" upon which a 
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judgment lien attached. U.C.A.1953, 57—1— 
1(3), 78-22-1. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and def-
initions. 
13. Judgment <£=>780(1) 
Equitable considerations did not make it 
unfair to hold that judgment lien attached to 
quitclaim deed grantee's interest in property 
deeded by grantor so that grantee could 
pledge the property as collateral for a loan 
secured by a trust deed, where grantor and 
trust deed beneficiary, with a modicum of 
care, could have accomplished their objective 
of creating a mortgage lien with priority over 
the judgment lien. 
ON CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Bruce A. Maak, Salt Lake City, for plain-
tiff. 
Kent B. Linebaugh, Stephen R. Sloan, Salt 
Lake City, for defendants. 
STEWART, Justice: 
111 This case, which we originally trans-
ferred over to the Utah Court of Appeals, is 
here on certiorari from a decision by that 
court, Capital Assets Financial Services v. 
Lindsay, 956 P.2d 1090 (Utah Ct.App.1998). 
The Court of Appeals reversed the district 
court's grant of summary judgment in favor 
of Capital Assets Financial Services ("Capital 
Assets"). We affirm. 
112 The facts of the case are undisputed. 
In May 1994, Dean R. Lindsay obtained a 
default judgment against R. Craig Christen-
sen in Utah County. Under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-22-1(2), that judgment became "a lien 
upon [Christensen's] real property . . . 
owned or acquired during the existence of 
the judgment, located in the county in which 
the judgment is entered." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-22-1(2) (1996). 
113 In late 1994, Christensen sought a 
loan from Capital Assets. Capital Assets 
required collateral to secure the loan, and 
Christensen asked a friend, Larry Peterson, 
whether he or a family member could make 
1. Lindsay and Capital Assets are the only parties 
real estate available as security. In January 
1995, Peterson's daughter, Janae Peterson 
Lott, gave Christensen a quitclaim deed for 
real property she owned in fee in Utah Coun-
ty. There is no dispute that on the date she 
executed the quitclaim deed, she was the fee 
title holder. According to uncontested affi-
davits from Lott, Peterson, and Christensen, 
Christensen was to use the property to ob-
tain a loan from Capital Assets and then 
reconvey the property to Lott. Christensen 
and Lott never intended that Christensen 
would fully own the property. 
114 Subsequently, Christensen delivered 
a trust deed for the property dated January 
17, 1995, to Capital Assets. Under the trust 
deed, Capital Assets was the named benefi-
ciary and the trustee had the power to sell 
the property for the benefit of Capital Assets 
if Christensen defaulted on the loan. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-23 (1994). Lott's 
quitclaim deed to Christensen and Christen-
sen's trust deed in favor of Capital Assets 
were both recorded January 18, 1995. On 
April 25, 1995, Christensen reconveyed the 
property to Lott by warranty deed. Lindsay 
sought to execute on his judgment lien by 
sheriffs sale on December 13,1995. 
115 Capita] Assets sued Lindsay, Lott, 
and two other judgment lienholders to settle 
the order of Hen priority on the property.1 
Capital Assets moved for summary judgment 
based on affidavits from Lott, Peterson, and 
Christensen, which stated that, despite Lott's 
absolute quitclaim deed of the property to 
Christensen, Lott and Christensen only in-
tended that Christensen use the property as 
collateral. 
116 The district court granted summary 
judgment to Capital Assets for two reasons. 
First, the court ruled that the affidavits were 
admissible to show the intent of the parties 
as to the quitclaim deed. Second, based on 
the affidavits and Christensen's reconveyance 
of the property to Lott, the court ruled that 
the sole purpose of the quitclaim deed was to 
provide Christensen collateral for the pur-
pose of obtaining a loan. After obtaining the 
loan, Christensen was obligated to return his 
interest in the property to Lott. In short, the 
before this Court. 
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court held that Christensen had only a tem-
porary, limited interest in the property and 
that a judgment lien could not attach thereto. 
117 The Court of Appeals reversed the 
trial court's summary judgment and held 
that Christensen's interest was subject to the 
judgment lien. The court stated: 
In giving Christensen a quitclaim deed 
to her property, Lott intended to transfer 
enough ownership to Christensen to allow 
him to obtain financing by offering the 
property as security for a loan. Lott in-
tended that Christensen have the authority 
to transfer to Capital Assets the power to 
sell the land for an unpaid debt. This 
degree of ownership is sufficient for a 
judgment debtor to acquire the power to 
possess by levy, or sell by foreclosure, the 
real property to satisfy the unpaid judg-
ment Under the circumstances so de-
scribed, the judgment liens are prior and 
superior to the interest conveyed by the 
trust deed. 
Capital Assets, 956 P.2d at 1096. 
[1] 118 We issued a writ of certiorari to 
review that ruling. On certiorari, we review 
the decision of the Court of Appeals for 
correctness. See Bear River Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Wall, 978 P.2d 460, 461 (Utah 1999). 
119 In this Court, Capital Assets argues 
that the Court of Appeals' decision is wrong 
because (1) a judgment lien attaches only to 
a judgment debtor's beneficial interest in 
property, (2) Christensen did not possess a 
beneficial interest because he held the prop-
erty for the limited purpose of securing his 
loan and therefore had only a bare legal title, 
and (3) the decision is unfair. 
[2] 1fl0 It is axiomatic that "a judg-
ment lien has no greater dignity in property 
2. The Court of Appeals agreed with the district 
court that the affidavits, to the degree they al-
leged facts, not law, were properly admissible to 
show that Lott and Christensen intended that 
Christensen would have ownership in the proper-
ty only to the extent needed to obtain a loan, i.e., 
convey a trust deed interest to Capital Assets. 
See Capital Assets, 956 P.2d at 1094. Neither 
party has asked the Court to review this holding; 
therefore, the Court of Appeals' decision on that 
point stands. 
law than the nature of the property interest 
to which it attaches." Butler v. Wilkinson, 
740 P.2d 1244, 1257 (Utah 1987). There is no 
dispute that Christensen held an interest in 
the property during the time Lindsay had a 
judgment lien against whatever real property 
interests Christensen had in the county. 
Lott's quitclaim, on its face, conveyed all her 
rights, title, and interest in the property to 
Christensen with the intent, according to ex-
trinsic evidence, that he have an interest 
sufficient to convey a trust deed to Capital 
Assets. On the face of it, that interest is 
"real property" under section 78-22-1, the 
judgment lien statute. Therefore, Christen-
sen had an interest in the property at least 
"to the degree necessary to convey a trust 
deed interest to Capital Assets."2 See Capi-
tal Assets, 956 P.2d at 1094. That is what 
Lott intended in quitclaiming to Christensen. 
Ull A trust deed is 
a deed . . . conveying real property to a 
trustee in trust to secure the performance 
of an obligation of the trustor or other 
person named in the deed to a beneficiary. 
A trust deed is similar to a mortgage in 
that it is given as security for the perfor-
mance of an obligation. However, a trust 
deed is a conveyance by which title to the 
trust property passes to the trustee. 
Upon default, the trustee has power to sell 
the property to satisfy the trustor's debt to 
the beneficiary. 
First Sec. Bank v. Banberry Crossing, 780 
P.2d 1253, 1256 (Utah 1989) (emphasis add-
ed) (internal quotation marks and footnotes 
omitted); see also Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-1-
19 to -36 (1994). 
[3,4] 1112 Thus, a trust deed is intend-
ed to convey some kind of title to real prop-
erty.3 Of necessity, it conveys more than 
3. The trust deed that Christensen conveyed to 
Capital Assets is consistent with the notion that a 
trust deed conveys title to property. That deed 
indicates: 
Borrower [Christensen] irrevocably grants and 
conveys to Trustee, in trust, with power of sale, 
the following described Property located in 
UTAH County, Utah. . . . 
BORROWER COVENANTS that Borrower is 
lawfully seized of the estate hereby conveyed and 
has the right to grant and convey the Property 
204 Utah 994 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
"bare legal title" to land because the point of 
the deed is to allow the sale of the property 
upon default to satisfy the underlying obli-
gation. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-23 
(1994). Christensen's trust deed is conceded 
to be valid. Indeed, Christensen and Capitol 
Assets admitted Christensen's beneficial in-
terest in the property when they executed 
the trust deed. The trust deed states: 
Borrower [Christensen] irrevocably grants 
and conveys to Trustee, in trust, with pow-
er of sale, the following described Proper-
ty. . . . 
BORROWER COVENANTS that Bor-
rower is lawfully seized of the estate here-
by conveyed and has the right to grant 
and convey the Property . . . . 
Capital Assets would not have accepted the 
trust deed as security if it had not agreed 
that Christensen held the property interest 
asserted therein. It follows that the trustor 
in this case necessarily possessed sufficient 
fee interest in the property to sell it under 
certain circumstances. Otherwise, he could 
not have conveyed that right to the beneficia-
ry. 
U13 In short, Lott quitclaimed her inter-
est in the property to Christensen to enable 
him to create a trust deed. Therefore, as a 
matter of law and logic, Christensen held a 
fee interest in the property sufficient to allow 
him to sell it. 
and that the Property is unencumbered, except 
for encumbrances of record. Borrower war-
rants and will defend generally the title to the 
Property against all claims and demands, sub-
ject to any encumbrances of record. 
. . . Reconveyance. Upon payment of all 
sums secured by this Security Instrument, 
Lender shall request Trustee to reconvey the 
Property and shall surrender this Security In-
strument and all notes evidencing debt secured 
by this Security Instrument to Trustee. Trustee 
shall reconvey the Property without warranty 
and without charge to the person or persons 
legally entitled to it. Such person or persons 
shall pay any recordation costs. 
4. Capital Assets argues that it is possible to pos-
sess title sufficient to create an encumbrance on 
property and still not possess an interest to 
which a judgment lien can attach. It analogizes 
I. REQUIRED INTEREST FOR 
JUDGMENT LIEN TO 
ATTACH 
1114 The judgment lien statute states, 
"the entry of judgment by a district court is 
a lien upon the real property of the judgment 
debtor, not exempt from execution, owned or 
acquired during the existence of the judg-
ment, located in the county in which the 
judgment is entered." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-22-1(2) (1996). The real estate title of 
the Code defines "real property" as "any 
right, title, estate, or interest in land." Id. 
§ 57-1-1(3). 
[5-11] 1115 For purposes of section 78-
22-1, a judgment lien attaches to a debtor's 
beneficial and equitable property interests, 
see, e.g.t Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 
(Utah 1987), even if the debtor has no record 
title. See Utah Coop. Ass}n v. White Distrib. 
& Supply Co., 120 Utah 603, 237 P.2d 262 
(1951) rev'd on other grounds, 2 Utah 2d 391, 
275 P.2d 687 (1954). Once a judgment lien 
attaches, a judgment creditor may levy exe-
cution on the property or foreclose on the 
lien if called upon to defend against an action 
to cancel the lien interest. See Free v. Farn-
worth, 112 Utah 410, 188 P.2d 731 (1948). 
However, a judgment lien will not attach to a 
debtor's "bare legal title" in property be-
cause such a debtor holds no equitable or 
beneficial interest in the land. See, e.g., Bel-
nap v. Blain, 575 P.2d 696 (Utah 1978). For 
example, a judgment lien will not attach to a 
vendor's interest in a land sale contract.4 
this case to Cannefax v. Clement, 818 P.2d 546 
(Utah 1991), in which the Court held that a 
judgment lien could not attach to a vendor's 
interest in a land sale contract. See id. at 549. 
The holding in Cannefax hinged on the concept 
of equitable conversion, which "transfer m[s] a 
vendor's interest in a land sale contract from a 
real property interest into a personal property 
interest" as the vendee pays the installments on 
the contract. See id. at 548. The Court stated 
that "the vendor's true interest is in receiving the 
unpaid amount on the contract, an interest more 
akin to personalty than to realty." Id. at 549. 
Equitable conversion, however, does not apply in 
this situation, in which Christensen conveyed a 
trust deed to Capital Assets. Christensen's inter-
est in the property was not personalty; it was 
real property, as a trust deed is a "[t]ransfer[ ] in 
trust of real property." Utah Code Ann. § 57-1— 
20. Since that interest was realty, not personal-
ty, a judgment lien could attach to it. 
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See Cannefax v Clement, 818 P 2d 546, 549-
50 (Utah 1991) (stating that the vendor holds 
title for the benefit of the vendee and that, 
based on equitable conversion, vendor's real 
interest is in personalty, not realty) Nor 
will a judgment hen attach to an agent's or 
trustee's interest m property5 See Barlow 
Soc'y v Commercial Sec Bank, 723 P 2d 398, 
401 (Utah 1986)(statmg that one holds bare 
legal title if one is "the trustee of an express, 
constructive, or resulting trust, or an agent, 
or mere conduit for the transfer [of property] 
to the true owner") None of these examples 
applies m fact or by analogy to Christensen 
He was not a vendor m a land sale contract, 
nor was he a trustee or an agent under the 
facts of this case6 
1116 Nevertheless, Capital Assets asserts 
that Chnstensen's interest amounted to 
"bare legal title," to which a judgment hen 
could not attach They rely on dictum found 
m Belnap v Blain, 575 P 2d 696 (Utah 1978), 
to support their argument In Belnap, a 
plurality quoted the following language from 
Freeman on Judgments but stated that it 
was inapplicable to the case 
"[W]henever one holds the naked legal ti-
tle, having no beneficial interest, there is 
nothing to which the judgment hen can 
attach, and a sale under execution to a 
purchaser with notice is inoperative, and 
does not even convey the legal title 
Hence when a grantee is a mere conduit, 
as where he purchases property m his 
name as the agent of another, with the 
latter's funds, and subsequently conveys to 
5 An agent may hold title to property after pur 
chasing it or before selling it on behalf of the 
actual owner See, e g Zenda Mining & Milling 
Co v Tiffin, 11 CalApp 62, 104 P 10 (1909) 
Wheeler v Nelson, 130 Minn 365, 153 NW 861 
(1915), Cresswellv McCaig, 11 Neb 222 9 N W 
52 (1881) Also, trustees hold title in the res of a 
trust in their names, but do so on behalf of the 
trust beneficiaries, not themselves See e g Riv 
erdale Mining Co v Wicks, 14 CalApp 526, 112 
P 896(1910), Fitch v Double V" Sales Corp 
212 Md 324, 129 A 2d 93 (1957), Brown v 
Hodgman, 124 W Va 136, 19 S E 2d 910 (1942) 
In each of these instances, the agent or trustee 
appears to be the owner of the property because 
title is in the agent's or trustee s name, however, 
the actual owner is someone else, for whom the 
agent or trustee holds the property See, eg, 
Riverdale Mining 14 CalApp at 535-36, 112 P 
896 If the agent or trustee were to misuse or 
him, there is no interest to which a judg-
ment hen can attach The same result 
arises when title is placed in the name of a 
person so that he may sell it and pay the 
proceeds to the owner, or solely to enable 
him to procure a loan thereon, and after 
procuring the loan, he reconveys to his 
grantor " 
Id at 699 (emphasis added) (quoting 2 Free-
man on Judgments § 956, at 2010-11 (5th 
ed 1925)) Capital Assets relies heavily on 
this language, citing the emphasized portion 
as dispositive m this case 
[12] 1117 We have never adopted as 
Utah law the specific Belnap dictum at issue 
here7 We dechne to do so now There is a 
significant difference between the type of 
bare legal title possessed by an agent or 
trustee and the beneficial interest that Chris-
tensen undisputably possessed here 
Agents and trustees have no direct beneficial 
interest m the property to which they hold 
title Their title is held purely for the bene-
fit of another In the instant case, Christen-
sen received from Lott more than bare legal 
title The quitclaim deed was consistent with 
passing a fee interest and the intent of the 
parties was to allow Christensen to use the 
property as security for his own benefit To 
hold that Chnstensen's interest was a non-
beneficial, "bare legal title" would be incon-
sistent with chain of title and the intent of 
the parties 
II. EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS 
[13] 1118 Finally, Capital Assets argues 
it is manifestly unfair to Lott and Capital 
misappropriate the property the actual owner 
could sue for damages 
6 The Court of Appeals correctly stated Nei 
ther Lott nor Christensen intended that Christen-
sen act as trustee or agent for Lott Capital 
Assets, 956 P 2d at 1094 A review of the record 
confirms that the property was not the res of an 
express, constructive, or resulting trust in which 
Christensen was trustee Nor was Christensen 
Lott's agent, since neither Lott s quitclaim deed 
to Christensen or those parties' affidavits indi-
cate that he had actual or apparent authority to 
act on Lott s behalf 
7 In Barlow we acknowledged that the same 
proposition advanced by plaintiffs in that case 
was supported by dictum in Belnap, but we did 
not base our decision m Barlow on the dictum 
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Assets to hold that a judgment lien may 
attach to Christensen's property interest. It 
is no doubt true that the result in this case 
does not comport with the expectations of 
Lott and Capital Assets. However, with con-
veyances of real property, we necessarily 
deal with the recording act and the policies 
underlying it which are intended to impede 
fraud, to foster the alienability of real prop-
erty, and to provide for predictability and 
integrity in real estate transactions. To that 
end, the intention of the parties to a transac-
tion may be overridden by rules that pro-
mote a basic policy that, in the long run, will 
effectuate the intentions of most parties in 
most transactions. As we have stated be-
fore, "Under U.C.A., 1953, 78-22-1, a judg-
ment automatically becomes a lien upon all 
nonexempt real property of the judgment 
debtor at the time it is docketed. [The] . . . 
right to a judgment lien is unconditional and 
is not subject to alteration by a court on 
equitable grounds." Taylor Nat'l, Inc. v. 
Jensen Bros. Constr. Co., 641 P.2d 150, 155 
(Utah 1982). With a modicum of care, the 
parties could easily have accomplished their 
objective without any complications. For 
this Court to extricate them from the difficul-
ties they have created would required us to 
ignore the plain meaning of the judgment 
lien statute. 
IT 19 Affirmed. 
1 20 Chief Justice HOWE, Justice 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice RUSSON, and 
Judge HILDER concur in Justice 
STEWARTS opinion. 
U 21 Having disqualified herself, 
Associate Chief Justice DURHAM does not 
participate herein; District Judge ROBERT 
K. HILDER sat. 
